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Petitioners/Appellants Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin submit this Reply Brief
addressing the arguments xaised by Respondent/Appellee Utah Department of Health,
Division of Medicaid and Health Financing (Agency) in its Amended Brief of Appellee.
ARGUMENT
It should be noted initially that the Agency cites no Medicaid-specific case law to
support its response to any of the arguments raised by Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin.
It simply tries to distinguish cases and minimize their importance. The only new cases it
cites are Utah state court cases addressing rules of statutory construction and waiver of
issues not raised in proceedings below.
L

THE ALJMISCHARACTERIZES THE LEVEL OF DISCRETION A
STATE MEDICAID AGENCY HAS IN DEVELOPING AND
IMPLEMENTING ITS MEDICAID PROGRAM.
In their Amended Opening Brief Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin set out the

general parameters of a state Medicaid agency^ s discretion in developing and
implementing its state plan. They then identify how the ALJ mischaracterized an
agency's level of discretion. The Agency does not address this basic question of the
scope of discretion a state Medicaid agency enjoys.
EL

MEDICAL SERVICES AND DEVICES CAN FALL WITHIN MULTIPLE
MEDICAID CATEGORIES OF SERVICES.
Here Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin outline how Speech Augmentative

Communication Devices (SACETs) can fall within multiple categories of services,
specifically, Home Health Services (Durable Medical Equipment) and Prescribed Drugs,
Dentures and Prosthetic Devices, as well as Physical Therapy and Related Services. The
1
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Agency asserts that since SACD's are separately and explicitly defined as speech
language pathology services in the Medicaid Act and implementing regulations they
cannot be considered DME or prosthetic devices. This position is critical to much of the
Agency's legal analysis.
Physical Therapy and Related Services is one of 29 categories of services that can
be included in a state Medicaid plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(l 1). Home Health Services
(42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(7)) andPrescribed Drugs, Dentures and Prosthetic Devices (42
U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(12)) are also in that list of29 categories of services. Services for
individuals with speech, hearing and language disorders fall within the Physical Therapy
and Related Services category of services. These services include supplies and
equipment as well. 42 C.F.R. § 440.110(c)(1). The Agency points out that SACD's can
be considered a form of equipment under this definition. Appellee's Amended Brief pp.
7-8,13. The Agency concedes that SACD's fall within the definition of Durable
Medicaid Equipment (DME). Appellee's Amended Brief, p. 18. It does not confirm or
deny whether they fall within the definition of Prosthetic Devices.
The Agency asserts that since SACD's fall within the "speech, language and
hearing disorder" group of services under the Physical Therapy and Related Services •
category of services, they are intrinsically and exclusively within that group of services.
It argues that SACD's cannot fall within the Home Health Services or Prescribed Drugs,
Dentures and Prosthetic Devices categories of services (Appellee's Brief, p. 13), even
i
2
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though SACD's are not mentioned specifically in 42 C.F.R. § 440.110. The Agency
offers no support for why SACD's can only fall within this one category.
As outlined in Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Amended Opening Brief, the
general proposition that a service or device can only fall within one category of services
is contrary to the case law, including the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling in Hern
v. Beye, 57 F 3 d 906 (10th Cir. 1996), which, as apart of its analysis, determined that
abortion services fall within at least four categories of services. Id, at 910. The Agency
also offers no meaningful analysis why the inclusion of "equipment" under 42 C.F.R. §
440.110 precludes SACD's from falling within "equipment" in "Medical supplies,
equipment, and appliances suitable for use in the home," found in the Home Health
Services category of services (42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3)). The Agency's exclusivity
argument is inconsistent with a case addressing the question directly. Fred C. v. Texas
Health and Human Semices Commission, 924 F. Supp. 788,791-92 (W.D. Tex. 1996).
The Agency argues that if SACD's fall within the category of Home Health
Services, they can only be considered speech language pathology under that category of
services. Appellee's Brief, p. 13. Home Health Services include: nursing services, home
health aide services, medical supplies, equipment, and appliances suitable for use in the
home, and physical therapy, occupational therapy, or speech pathology and audiology
services. 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(l)-(4). The Agency then claims that the definition of
"services for individuals with speech, hearing, and language disorders" found in 42
C.F.R. § 440.110(c) applies to "speech pathology" under 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4). As a
3
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consequence, SACD's cannot be considered durable medical equipment under 42 C.F.R.
§ 440.70(b)(3), but must come under "speech pathology" under 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4).
However, the terms in those two regulations are not the same. The definitions
provided in,42C.F.R. § 440.110 are not general, but specific to the category of services
Physical Therapy and Related Services. The term "speech pathology" used in 42 C.F.R.
§ 440.70(b)(4) (Home Health Services) is obviously narrower than "Services for
individuals with speech, hearing, and language disorders." The Agency fails to point to
anything suggesting that the definition of "services for individuals with speech, hearing,
and language disorders" in 42 C.F.R. § 440.110(c)(1) also defines the term "speech
language pathology" in 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4). Since "equipment" is specifically
identified in 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3) and is absent in 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4) it is more
reasonable to conclude that SACD's fall within 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3) rather than 42
C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4). This is the conclusion reached by the district court in Fred C. v.
Texas Health and Human Services Commission, 924 F.Supp.788, 791-92 (W.D. Tex.
1996). The vast majority of states likewise do not follow the Agency's analysis and
consider SACD's DME, as laid out in Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Amended
Opening Brief.
The Agency claims that this exclusivity of SACD's as speech language services
under the "Physical Therapy and Related Services" category of services in Utah's
Medicaid plan has been approved by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS.) It points to three pages taken from Utah's CMS approved plan. Those
4
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i

pages identify SACD's as an excluded service under speech language services. However,
those documents do not state that SACD's are exclusively speech language sendees
under the Utah plan. Nor do they identify SACD's as categorically excluded for adults
globally. The Agency has not demonstrated that CMS was put on notice that SACD's are
not considered DME or prosthetic devices, nor that they are excluded from coverage
under those categories of services. From the documents presented all CMS approved was
that SACD's will not be covered under the speech language group of services. Since
CMS has approved the coverage of SACD's by roughly forty-nine states as DME or
prosthetic devices, based upon the state plan provisions in the record, it also approved the
coverage of SACD5 s by Utah under both of those categories, since the Agency has
produced nothing demonstrating that they are specifically excluded under those two
categories of services.
It is clear that the Agency itself does not consider SACD's intrinsically and
exclusively speech language equipment under the Physical Therapy and Related Services
category of services. Utah Administrative Rule R414-70, Medical Supplies, Durable
Medical Equipment, and Prosthetic Devices, effective July 23,2007, 1 stated that
augmentative speech devices were not covered for adults under the service categories of
Durable Medical Equipment and Prosthetic Devices:
Medicaid covers prosthetic devices that include hearing aids, special orthopedic
appliances, prosthetic limbs, prosthetic eyes, braces, and orthoses. Medicaid
1

R414-70 was amended effective August 4,2008. In that amendment the provisions
relating to SACD's were removed.
5
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does not cover prosthetic devices that include special shoes, cochlear implants,
augmentative speech devices, and wigs or hair replacement after chemotherapy55
Utah Admin. Code R414-70-7(1).
Non Covered Items :
The following are not benefits:
(2) Augmentative Speech Devices.
Utah Admin. Code R414-70-9(20).
The Agency would not have included this specific exclusion of SACD's as DME
or prosthetic devices if it considered them falling exclusively within the speech language
services under Physical Therapy and Related Services category of services by federal
regulation, or under its state Medicaid plan approved by CMS. The Agency points to no
cases, statutes, regulations or agency documents that explicitly identify SACD's as
equipment that come only within the Physical Therapy and Related services category of
services. Its position is contrary to case law and the practice of 49 other states.
HI.

HOME HEALTH SERVICES IS A MANDATORY CATEGORY OF
SERVICES AND DME, WHICH FALLS WITHIN THAT CATEGORY OF
SERVICES, IS A MANDATORY SUBCATEGORY.
The Agency concedes that the Home Health Services category of services is a

mandatory category of services and must be included in Utah's state Medicaid plan.
Appellee's Amended Brief, p. 13.
DME is a mandatory part of Home Health Services.
(b) Home health services include the following services and items. Those listed
in paragraphs (b)(1), (2) and (3) of this section are required services; those in
paragraph (b)(4) of this section are optional....
(3) Medical supplies, equipment, and appliances suitable for use in the home.
6
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42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3).
The mandatory nature of Home Health Services and DME is critical in that the
foundation of the Agency's argument is that SACD's are an optional service since they
can only fall within the Physical Therapy and Related Services category of services. It
argues that since SACD's are an optional service it has greater discretion to exclude them
from coverage. The Agency's position on the scope of its discretion is not supported by
the case law, but even if it was, it could not rely on this optional/mandatory distinction.
IV.

THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY
NECESSARY SACD'S FROM COVERAGE FOR ADULTS AS DME
VIOLATES THE REASONABLE STANDARDS MANDATE OF 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(17).
In their Amended Opening Brief, Argument III, Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin

present three independent arguments why the Agency's categorical exclusion of coverage
of SACD's for adults violates the Reasonable Standards mandate of 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(17). First, such a policy is unreasonable in that it denies some adults a device
that is essential for them to engage in a fundamental process, oral communication. By
doing so it limits that individual's independence. Second, such a policy creates an
exclusive list of available DME, with no reasonable and meaningful process for
requesting medically necessary SACD's. Third, the Agency cannot categorically exclude
from coverage a medically necessary service that falls within a category of services
included in the Utah Medicaid plan.
The Agency's Response
7
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Of those three arguments, the Agency addresses only one directly - that its policy
creates an exclusive list of available DME, with no reasonable and meaningful process
for requesting medically necessary SACD's. Appellee's Brief, pp. 20-22. The Agency
does not specifically address Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's analysis under the
other two arguments. It begins by more generally asserting that the Reasonable
Standards mandate, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17), applies only to Medicaid agency policies
regarding Medicaid eligibility. It does not apply to policies regarding service coverage.
To the extent it does apply to coverage of specific services or equipment the Agency
asserts that it only applies to financial criteria for coverage of those specific services or
equipment.
The Agency next attempts to distinguish cases cited by Nicholas Conley and Patty
Olguin in the three parts of their Reasonable Standards argument. It does not apply the
distinctions to Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin5 s analysis under any of those three
arguments. It does not explain how those distinctions affect the specific theory of those
arguments. The Agency distinguishes Hern v. Beye, 57 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1996) by
arguing that its holding only applies to mandatory services. It then relates this to its
position that SACD's can only be considered speech language services and equipment, a
part of the optional category of Physical Therapy and Related Services. Based upon the
i

mandatory versus optional distinction, it asserts Hern does not apply.
The Agency next identifies differences in the issues before the courts between
this matter and McMillian v. McCrimon, 807 F. Supp. 475 (CD. 111. 1992). However,
8
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Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin cite McMillian only for the very general proposition
that a state Medicaid agency's discretion in developing and implementing its state
Medicaid plan is limited.
The Agency argues that the decision in William T. v. Taylor, 465 F. Supp.2d 1267
(N.D. Ga. 2000) is unpersuasive here. The court left open the question of whether
categorically denying adults SACD' s while providing them to children violates the
Reasonable Standards or Amount, Duration and Scope Medicaid mandates, or the CMS
Dear State Medicaid Director letter of September 4, 1998 (DeSario Letter.)
As a final global challenge to Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Reasonable
Standards arguments the Agency asserts that their position creates an irreconcilable
conflict between the federal regulations that make SACD's an optional service under the
category of Physical Therapy and Related Services and the broader Reasonable Standards
mandate. It claims that those regulations specifically target SACD's exclusively as an
optional service. It would then follow that since SACD's are not a mandatory service,
and since rules of statutory construction require that irreconcilable conflicts between a
more specific and more general statutory provision be resolved in favor of the more
specific provision, Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Reasonable Standards
arguments fail. Underpinning this argument is the unarticulated position that a state
Medicaid agency has far more discretion to limit the coverage of services within an
optional category of services than it does with services within mandatory categories of
services, a position it never supports with case law.
9
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In a separate Point IV, the Agency contends that Nicholas Conley and Patty
Olguin cannot raise for the first time on appeal the Reasonable Standards argument that
its policies in effect create an exclusive list with no reasonable and meaningful procedure
for requesting an SACD, Argument IILB. of their Amended Opening Brief It asserts that
they have waived the right to raise it since that argument was not presented in the
administrative proceedings below. It further argues that, if the court decides to consider
the argument, that it should reject it because (1) the DeSario Letter that is the foundation
of the claim should be given little weight, and (2) it has a reasonable and meaningful
procedure for requesting coverage of SACD's. That process is the standard
administrative review process in which this case began.
Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Reply
A.

THE AGENCY'S POLICY THAT EXCLUDES COVERAGE OF
MEDICALLY NECESSARY SACD'S FOR ADULTS AS DME IS
UNREASONABLE IN THAT IT MAKES UNAVAILABLE A DEVICE
THAT IS ESSENTIAL FOR ENGAGING IN A FUNDAMENTAL AND
ESSENTIAL HUMAN PROCESS, COMMUNICATING ORALLY, AND
LIMITS THE INDIVIDUAL'S INDEPENDENCE.
The Agency did not address this argument.

B.

THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY
NECESSARY SACD'S FOR ADULTS AS DME CREATES AN
EXCLUSIVE LIST FOR WHICH THERE IS NO REASONABLE AND
MEANINGFUL PROCEDURE FOR REQUESTING THE DEVICE.
This variation of the Reasonable Standards argument was not brought in the

administrative proceedings below. Regardless of that fact this court can and should
consider this legal argument.
10
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The rule on waiver of an issue that is not raised in initial proceedings is not an
absolute. 4 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 297 (2010); Apex Electronics Corp. v. Gee, 217
Wis. 2d 37-8,577 N.W.2d 23 (1998). It is appropriate to ignore the rule when the issue
involves a question of law and there are no facts in dispute. Roberts v. American Family
Mutual Insurance Co., 144 P.3d 546 (Colo. 2006) (undisputed facts); Noghrey v. Town of
Brookhaven, 21 A.D.3d 1016, 801 N.Y.S.2d 620 (2d Dep't 2005) (issue was not based on
new facts, but rather, involved a question of law appearing on the face of the record).
Whether both parties have had the opportunity to brief the issue is also a factor an
appellate court should consider. County of Montgomery v. Deer Creek, Inc., 29 A 111.
App. 3d 851, 691 N.E.2d 185 (SthDist. 1998).
The Agency cites Holmstrom v. CR. England, Inc., 8 P.3d 281 (UT 2000) in
support of its waiver argument. The issue there was a mixed issue of law and fact whether a proposed jury instruction was appropriate. The Court stated that one of the
purposes of the waiver rule is to promote judicial economy. Id. at 288. Requiring parties
to raise issues at the trial level makes the parties "crystallize issues prior to appeal." Id.
Here judicial economy will be promoted if the court considers this argument.
There are no factual disputes in this appeal. As solely a legal argument this court would
look at the argument in question independent of any legal analysis of the ALJ, had it been
raised below. The legal issue is "crystallized." The Agency is not prejudiced by
considering this argument. Nothing more could have been done at the administrative
level to more fully flesh out the issue. The Agency briefed the substance of the argument
11
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at this level. Should the court rule against Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin without
addressing this legal theory other adults needing an SACD can request prior authorization
for coverage of an SACD and eventually raise this argument again to this court during
appellate review.
It should be noted that in a separate administrative appeal, involving a differentadult requesting prior authorization of coverage for a medically necessary SACD, the
Agency moved to place that appeal in pending status until this appeal could be decided.
In its initial motion the Agency stated that all issues that would come before the ALJ
were already before this court on appeal:
[t]he attorney handling the appeal for the state in the combined cases informed
counsel for the respondent agency in the present matter that the reasonable
standard argument is before the Court of Appeals. The state is not opposing the
issue as it was heard at the agency level of the adjudicative process... The
appellate attorney for the state has responded with an amended response brief to
respond to the appellant's amended reasonable standards argument.
With the reasonable standards argument being presently argued and heard by the
Court of Appeals on the identical issue of augmented speech devices not being
provided to adults under Medicaid, but, to children under Medicaid's EPSDT
program, there is no reason to brief it before the ALJ in the present matter.
Motion to Place Case in Pending Status; X v. Utah Department of Health, Case No. 10357-01, pp. 2-3? The position taken by the Agency in that administrative matter
indicates that it has fully addressed this Exclusive List/Reasonable Standards argument in
this appeal. It will not be prejudiced if this court hears this issue. In fact, it argued that
judicial economy would be better served if the legal question is considered here and
2

A copy of the Motion to Place Case in Pending Status, the Response and Reply are
included in the Reply Addendum.
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stayed at the administrative hearing level in the other case. What cannot be allowed is for
the Agency to play it both ways: ask that it be considered in neither case.
The Agency responded substantively to Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's
exclusive list argument by stating that it should be rejected because the CMS DeSario
Letter that it is based upon should be given little weight. It characterizes the decision in
William T v. Taylor, 465 F. Supp.2d 1267 (NX). Ga. 2000) as questioning the
"credibility" of the letter, quoting language in the decision about the deference that
should be given to the letter. This is an inaccurate characterization of the court's
analysis. In fact the court noted that "the letter reflects a reasonable interpretation of the
law and that it forecloses defendants' contention." Id. at 1279. The discussion quoted by
the Agency has nothing to do with the substance of the letter. Instead, it addresses in
general what weight an agency guidance letter should be given under Chevron standards.
In their Amended Opening Brief Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin cite cases where the
courts gave the letter far greater deference, including the United States Supreme Court in
Slekis v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 1098 (1999).
The Agency asserts that it has a reasonable and meaningful procedure for
requesting items of DME not appearing on its list of covered equipment - the
administrative appeal process. This is not a procedure specific to the process of
requesting coverage of an unlisted item of DME. The effectiveness of this process was
demonstrated below - the request was not considered because coverage of SACD's for
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adults is categorically denied. It is a process with no possibility of approval of the
device for any adult individual.
C.

THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY
NECESSARY SACD'S, WHICH FALL WITHIN THE COVERED
CATEGORY OF SERVICES DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT/HOME
HEALTH SERVICES, VIOLATES THE REASONABLE STANDARDS
MANDATE OF 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17).
The requirement asserted here is simple: if you include a category of services in.

your state Medicaid plan, you must cover all medically necessary services that fall within
that category of services. Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's primary support for that
position is the Tenth Court of Appeals' decision in Hern v. Beye, 57 R3d 906 (10 Cir.
1996), although they cited other cases holding the same. While the Agency's effort to
minimize Hern's relevance was not raised specifically under this argument, they will
address it here. The Agency points out that the services in Hern were services in a
mandatory category of services. However, it failed to show how the court's analysis
would change if the services in question were in an optional category of services that was
included in the state Medicaid plan. Other courts have extended Hern's holding to
optional categories of services. See Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 511 (8th Cir.
2006); T.L. v. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, 42 P.3d 63, 66
(Colo. Q . App. 2001).
Furthermore, the mandatory/optional distinction is irrelevant. The rule is well
established that once a state Medicaid agency includes an optional category of services in
its state plan it is bound by all Medicaid Act requirements as to those services. Weaver v.
14
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i

Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1989); Fred C v. Texas Health and Human Services
Commission, 924 F. Supp. 788,790 (WD. Tex. 1996).
The Agency's argument unrelated to the specific theories presented by Nicholas
Conley and Patty Olguin follow. Its global argument that the Reasonable Standards
provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) applies only to eligibility questions is unsupported.
The Agency cites no case supporting its proposition. This position was expressly rejected
in Hodgson v. Board of County Commissioners, County of Hennepin, 614F.2d 601, 609
(8th Cir. 1980) (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444, 97 S.Ct. 2366, 2370-71 (1977)).
In their Amended Opening Brief Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin cite numerous cases
that apply this requirement to the coverage of services. They are not limited to financial
considerations in coverage.
The distinctions drawn by the Agency between this matter and the decision in
William T. v. Taylor, 465 F. Supp.2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2000) do not in any way undercut
Nicholas Conley5s and Patty Olguin's Reasonable Standards arguments. In fact, that case
supports the irrelevance of a mandatory/optional class of services distinction. Many of
the distinctions the Agency attempts to draw in this case go to its point that SACD's here
fall within an optional category of services. However, one of the three defenses raised
by the Georgia Medicaid agency in William T was that it
has wide discretion in determining the amount, duration, and scope of medical
care that is provided under its medical program and that because ACDs fall
within one of several optional classes of assistance, GDMA has the discretion to
limit the services it provides under the given optional classes of assistance.
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Id. at 1272. The Medicaid agency did not argue whether SACD's should fall within
speech language pathology as opposed to prosthetic devices because it felt the difference
was irrelevant - both are optional categories of services and, thus, it had ultimate
discretion to exclude coverage based upon that fact. Id. at 1285.
The court ruled that Georgia's categorical exclusion of coverage of SACD's for
adults and children violated the Medicaid Act. The Medicaid agency did not have the
discretion it claimed. While it did not rule on the viability of an adult/child distinction in
coverage, it did say that such a policy would likely violate the Reasonable Standards and
Amount, Duration and Scope requirements of the Medicaid Act. Id. at 1288. The level
of discretion that the Agency asserts here in regard to services within optional categories
of services is the same as that claimed in William T. It has gone beyond the bounds of its
discretion, just as the Georgia Medicaid agency had in William T.
The Agency's asserts that Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's position creates
an irreconcilable conflict between the definition of speech language services and the
Reasonable Standards mandate. Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's position creates
no such conflict. The conflict is in the result the Agency wants. There is no conflict in
the two provisions because the nature of each is quite different. The relevant portion of
the "specific" regulation the Agency refers to, 42 C.F.R. § 440.110, is simply definitional
i

- it identifies what services come within the category of "Services for individuals with
speech, hearing, and language disorders." 42 C.F.R. § 440.110(c). The Reasonable
Standards mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) establishes a limitation on utilization
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control. By their nature the two cannot conflict. There is nothing about Nicholas
Conley's and Patty Olguin's interpretation of the relationship between the Reasonable
Standards mandate and the Agency's policies that is somehow in conflict with the simple
definition of speech services set out in 42 C.F.R. § 440.110. The conflict arises from the
Agency's claim that since SACD's fall within an optional category of services that it has
almost unfettered discretion in limiting or excluding the coverage of services within that
optional category of services. This is the meat of the Agency's entire argument. It has
cited no case law to support this position.
V.

THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY
NECESSARY SACD'S FROM COVERAGE FOR ADULTS AS DME
VIOLTES THE COMPARABILITY OF SERVICES MANDATE OF 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B).
In their Amended Opening Brief, Argument IV, Nicholas Conley and Patty

Olguin argue that the Agency's policy to categorically exclude coverage of SACD's for a
subgroup of categorically needy individuals, adults, violates the Comparability of
Sendees requirement of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B). It also violates
the Amount, Duration and Scope requirements of 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) and (c) in that
(1) it makes SACD's insufficiently available given medical purpose of the device, (2)
they are insufficiently available when compared to other types of DME, and (3) it denies
a type of DME necessary to address a specific impairment when other types of DME are
available that address a different impairment.
The Agency's Response
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In response to these arguments the Agency again takes something of a shotgun
approach. Its points are not related directly to the analysis laid out by Nicholas Conley
and Patty Olguin in Argument IVA., and Arguments IV.B1~3. Instead, it asserts that
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin are not arguing that they are being denied benefits that
others are receiving, but instead are focusing on an age distinction. It argues that age is
not specifically mentioned in 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) along with diagnosis, type of illness
or condition. It thus follows that this provision could not apply in this case. It points out
that subsection (c) of 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 speaks of "required" services, and since
SACD's are optional services subsection (c) does not apply.
The Agency next argues that its age-based differential treatment of SACD
coverage is simply a consequence of Medicaid's Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis
and Treatment (EPSDT) program, which requires states to provide enhanced services for
children. It points out that the EPSDT provisions require a state to make available to
children all 29 categories of services that can be included in a state's Medicaid plan.
Only seven must be available to adults. It asserts that all medically necessary services
must be provided to children while it has the discretion to deny adults medically
necessary services that fall into any optional category of services, even when the relevant
optional category of services is included in the state Medicaid plan. The Agency points
out that a case cited by Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin, Lankford v. Sherman, 451
F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2006), notes the distinction between services for children and adults,
stating that children may be given benefits not given to adults. Id. at 502.
18
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The Agency attempts to minimize the relevancy here of Fred C. v. Texas Health
and Human Service's Commission, 924 F.Supp.788 (W.D. Tex. 1996), a case cited by
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin in both their Reasonable Standards and Comparability
of Services arguments. The Agency did not tie its argument about Fred C. to either the
Comparability of Services or Reasonable Standards arguments specifically. It points out
that the court in Fred C. referred to the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in
Salgado v. Kirschner, 878 P.2d 659 (Ariz. 1994). Salgado dealt with organ transplants,
which are governed by a different Medicaid Act provision that requires like treatment for
similarly situated individuals. It then looked at the history of Fred C. and from this
attempted to show that along the way the court of appeals questioned an earlier decision
in the case. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in its second Fred C. decision said it was
bound by its previous remand order because of the "law of the case" doctrine. Fred C. v.
Texas Health and Human Sei-vices Commission, 167 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 1998). The
Agency calls the second court of appeals decision an "unenthusiastic affirmance."
Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Reply
A.

THE AGENCY'S EXCLUSION OF COVERAGE OF SACD'S FOR A
GROUP OF CATEGORICALLY NEEDY INDIVIDUALS FOR REASONS
OTHER THAN MEDICAL NEED VIOLATES THE COMPARABILITY
OF SERVICES MANDATE OF 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B).
Contrary to the Agency's position, the age-based distinction its policy creates does

involve the coverage of a device for one group of individuals and not another: children
versus adults. The two groups are similarly situated in that for members in each group
SACD's are medically necessary.
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B.

THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF SACD's FOR
ADULTS VIOLATES THE AMOUNT, DURATION AND SCOPE
REQUIREMENTS OF 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) AND (c).
Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's position that categorically denying access to

SACD's discriminates on the basis of differing physical impairments (Point IV.B.3.) is
supported in part by 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c). The Agency claims that the term "required"
found in that provision means that it can only apply to mandatory services. This is purely
a matter of speculation. It cites no case law or other regulations that support that
interpretation of the term. "Required" could just as easily refer to a service that is
required in that it is medically necessary for that individual. The Agency's interpretation
of the term would make that term meaningless when you consider that services within
optional and mandatory categories must be treated the same. See: Weaver v. Reagen,
886 F.2d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1989); Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Services
Commission, 924 F. Supp. 788, 790 (WD. Tex. 1996).
The Agency's argues that 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) is inapplicable because it speaks
of arbitrary denial or reduction of services "because of the [individuals] diagnosis, type of
illness, or condition." Because age is not included in this language this provision is
inapplicable to the Agency's age-based exclusion of SACD's for adults. This argument
completely ignores Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's analysis in their Argument
IV.B.3. Their analysis in that argument is that adults needing SACD's are discriminated
against as opposed to others with different types of disabilities who are provided different
i
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types of DME. Obviously the analysis addresses the condition of the individual, and not
just their age.
The Agency's global arguments that do not address the specific points laid out by
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin follow. The Agency's discussion of the differences in
services provided to children under the EPSDT program versus adult services suffers
from a basic confusion between categories of services and individual services. The
EPSDT program requires that all categories of services be available to children. Only
seven of the 29 categories must be available to adults. The Agency misinterprets
Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's argument, characterizing it as all medically
necessary services in all optional categories of services, whether or not included in the
state plan, must be available to adults. Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's position is
only that, for adults, when a category of services is included in a state's Medicaid plan,
all limitations on a state agency's utilization control discretion apply to services falling
within that included category of services. If an optional category of services is not
included in the plan, then adults have no access to services falling within that optional
category of services. The differences between children and adult sendees are substantial.
The Agency states that Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2006)
supports the notion that children can be provided services within a covered category of
sendees while adults can be denied those same services even if that category of services
is included in the state plan. It cites dicta from Lankford, that a state "may lawfully
provide additional benefits only to children and pregnant women." Id. at 502. Being
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dicta, and saying nothing more, it is unclear whether the court is referring to categories of
services or individual services within a category of services. As pointed out above, the
Lankford decision supports the holding of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hern v.
Beye, that all medically necessary services within a covered category of services must be
covered. Given this foundation, it is more reasonable to conclude that the Lankford court
was speaking to categories of services rather than individual services.
The Agency correctly points out that Meyers v. Reagan, 776 R2d241 (8th Cir.
1985) did not involve an age-based distinction in the provision of SACD's. Instead, Iowa
categorically excluded SACD's to both children and adults. Nicholas Conley and Patty
Olguin cite Meyers only in its Reasonable Standards argument involving the
unreasonableness of refusing to provide a device that is so important to support an
individual's independence and self-care. The analysis in which Meyers is used does not
depend on an age-based distinction.
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin cite Fred C v. Texas Health and Human
Services Commission, 924 F.Supp.788 (W.D. Tex. 1996). The Agency's effort to
minimize the weight that should be given to this case is based on a misinterpretation of
the language of the case. It's characterization of the second court of appeals decision as
an "unenthusiastic affirmance" turns a discussion of the law of the case doctrine into a
substantive evaluation of the merits of the plaintiffs' position. Most of the issues in the
case were addressed in the first court of appeals decision. Fred C v. Texas Health and
Human Services Commission, 167 F.3d 537, 1998 WL 915385, *2 (5th Cir. 1998). The
22
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Texas Medicaid Agency was trying to reargue issues decided in the first appeal. The
court of appeals was simply discussing why those issues would not be reviewed again
based upon the law of the case doctrine. Id. At no time during this discussion did it
question the reasonableness of the first circuit court decision on the three issues disposed
of in that decision.
The Agency also points out that the district court decision in Fred C. v. Texas
Health and Human Services Commission, 924 F.Supp.788 (WD. Tex. 1996) relied in
part on the Arizona Supreme Court decision in Salgado v. Kirschner, 878 P.2d 659 (Ariz.
1994) and pointed out that the sendee denied in that case was an organ transplant.
However, the Agency failed to state how this distinction affected the district court's
analysis in Fred C , and how a different resolution would have been reached had that
separate regulatory provision in Salgado not been there. The focus of the Salgado
decision was the unreasonableness of the age-based distinction in the coverage of organ
transplants. The district court in Fred C. referred to Salgado in its Reasonable Standards
analysis. It did not mention Salgado in the context of the Comparability of Services
mandate.
Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Amended Opening Brief includes
Arguments V and VI. The former lays out how the Reasonable Standards and
Comparability of Services arguments apply to SACD's as prosthetic devices. The latter
simply points out the fallacies of the ALJ's decision. The Agency did not separately
address Argument V or Argument VI, so no reply here is necessary in regards to those
23
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two points.
CONCLUSION
The Agency's position here is founded on two points. First, SACD's can only be
considered speech language services, and those fall within an optional category of
services, Physical Therapy and Related Services. Second, it has a great deal of discretion
when choosing which services it will cover under optional categories of services included
in Utah's Medicaid plan.
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin have demonstrated that SACD's fall within the
Home Health Services and Prescribed Drugs, Dentures and Prosthetic Devices categories
of services. The former is a mandatory category of services, and the latter is an optional
category that the Agency has included in Utah's Medicaid plan. SACD's are not
intrinsically limited to the Physical Therapy and Related Services category of services.
The Agency has far less discretion than it suggests in determining which services it will
provide. Its discretion is the same whether the service or equipment falls within a
mandatory or optional category of services. It's policy categorically excluding coverage
of SACD's for adults violates the Reasonable Standards mandate of 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(17) and the Comparability of Services/Amount, Duration and Scope mandates
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of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10(B) and its i.

ementing regulations, 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b)

and (c).
Respectfully submitted this 11

/of March, 2011.

Robert B. Denton
Laura Boswell
Attorneys for Nicholas Conley and
Patty Olguin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, first class mail, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Petitioners' Amended Reply Brief, this 11th day of March, 2011, to
the following:
Nancy L. Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
MarkL. Shurtleff
Attorney General
P.O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
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David McKnight, (#5218)
Assistant Attorneys General
Mark Shurtleff (#4666)
Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
288 North 1460 West, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-3101
(801)538-6404
dmcknight@utah. gov
Attorneys for Respondent, Utah Department of Health
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION MEDICAID AND HEALTH FINANCING
FAIR HEARINGS SECTION

Petitioner,
vs.

MOTION TO PLACE CASE
IN PENDING STATUS

)

Case No. 10-357-01

Utah Department of Health
Division of Medicaid and Health Financing,

ALJ Mary Kienitz

Respondent. )
Pursuant to Utah Code § 63G-4-102(9) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act,
respondent, Utah Department of Health by and through David McKnight, Assistant Attorney
General, moves the presiding officer for an order to place the above entitled matter in pending
status. Good cause exists for this motion in that the identical legal issues involved in this matter
including the reasonable standards argument are currently before the Utah Court of Appeals. It
would waste the time and resources of the administrative adjudicative body and the parties
involved in this case to go forward with briefing of the issues in this case when the identical
issues have been briefed adjudicated and are currently in appellate review.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Argument Supporting Motion
Mary Kienitz, the ALJ presiding in this matter held a pre-hearing on January 12,2011.
At the pre-hearing counsel for respondent agency, stated that this matter concerns denying an
augmented speech device to an adult under the Medicaid program. There are two combined
cases concerning the denial of augmented speech devices to adults under the Medicaid program
that have been adjudicated and are presently before the Utah Court of Appeals. The issues in the
combined cases before the Court of Appeals are identical to the issues in the present case. As
such, respondent agency asked that the present matter be put on pending status in order to wait
for the outcome of the Court of Appeals decision.
In response, petitioner stated that the attorney handling the appeal for the agency in the
combined cases is seeking to have the Court of Appeals not hear the reasonable standards issue
because the issue was not before the agency administrative proceeding. Petitioner wanted to
now brief that issue in the event that the Court of Appeals would not hear it and then if needed
petitioner could take the reasonable standards issue up to the Court of Appeals.
Based on the understanding that the reasonable standards issue would not be before the
Court of Appeals, the ALJ set up a briefing schedule for the parties to brief this issue.
Petitioner's brief is due on January 31 st and the agency brief is due on February 28 th with
petitioner's reply brief due March 10th.
Subsequent to the prehearing on the present matter, the attorney handling the appeal for
the state in the combined cases informed counsel for the respondent agency in the present matter
that the reasonable standard argument is before the Court of Appeals. The state is not opposing
the issue as it was heard at the agency level of the adjudicative process. Further, the appellate
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attorney for the state informed counsel for respondent agency in the present matter that the
petitioner in the appeal has submitted an amended appellate brief where the reasonable standards
argument is more fully presented to the court. The appellate attorney for the state has responded
with an amended response brief to respond to the appellant's amended reasonable standards
argument.
With the reasonable standards argument being presently argued and heard by the Court of
Appeals on the identical issue of augmented speech devices not being provided to adults under
Medicaid, but, to children under Medicaid's EPSDT program, there is no reason to brief it before
the ALJ in the present matter. It would be a complete waste of the ALJ's time, agency time and
respondent's time as well as resources to brief issues that have been heard decided and are
currently being appealed.
For these reasons, the respondent agency respectively requests the ALJ to place the
present case in pending status. Once the Court of Appeals rules on the legal issues that are
identical to the legal issues before the ALJ in the present matter the parties then will know how
to proceed in an appropriate and judicially efficient manner.
DATED this 18th day of January, 2011.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666)
Utah Attorney General

-SignedDavid McKnight, (#5218)
Assistant Attorneys General
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No: 10-357-01
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of January, 2011, I e-mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION TO PLACE CASE IN PENDING STATUS, to the following parties:
ROBERT DENTON
DISABILITY LAW CENTER
rdenton@disabilitylawcenter.org
MARYKJENITZ
ALJ, UDOH/DMHF
mkienitz(g),utah. gov
ANITA HALL
COVERAGE AND REIMBURSEMENT
UDOH/DMHF
ahall(a),utah.gov
-SignedDavid McKnight
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Robert B. Denton #0872
Disability Law Center
205 North 400 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Phone: (801)363-1347
Fax: (801)363-1437
e-mail: • rdenton@disabilitylawcenter.org
Attorneys for Petitioner

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO PLACE
IN PENDING STATUS

Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 10-357-01
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Respondent

Administrative Law Judge:
Mary Kienitz

Petitioner B H B i B f c hereby responds to Respondent's Motion to Place in Pending
Status. In that motion Respondent moves that, in order to avoid wasting the time and resources
of both parties, as well as the hearing officer, this matter should be placed in pending status, and
await the Utah Court of Appeal's decision in a similar case, Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin v.
Utah Department ofHealth, Division ofMedicaid and Health Financing, Utah Court of Appeals,
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Case No. 20100496 (hereinafter Conley/Olguin.) In Conley/Olguin the petitioners are appealing
Respondent's refusal to cover Speech Augmentative Communication Devices (hereinafter
SACD) for them because they are adults. This administrative appeal is based on the same legal
issue, and the parties are currently briefing that same issue.
As outlined in Respondent's motion, at a pre-hearing telephone conference held on
January 12, 2011, Respondent requested that this appeal be placed in pending status since the
issue here will ultimately be decided in Conley/Olguin. In response J H H B B I explained that in
Conley/Olguin Respondent has contested the petitioners' right there to present a part of their
Reasonable Standards mandate argument that was not briefed at the administrative stage. That
argument states that SACD's are durable medical equipment. Respondent covers durable
medical equipment. It also has a list that identifies what durable medical equipment is covered,
and the limitation on that coverage. SACD's are not included on that list. When a Medicaid
agency has a list of covered durable medical equipment it must still offer a meaningful process in
which an individual can request approval of coverage of an item of DME that does not appear on
the DME list. By categorically denying coverage of SACD's for adults Respondent maintains an
exclusive list of DME for that and other items not appearing on the list. Respondent has no
meaningful process for requesting coverage of a device that does not appear on its DME list.
This list, without a meaningful process for requesting coverage of the DME, violates the
Reasonable Standards mandate of the Medicaid Act.
P H H H a l s o pointed out that by placing this appeal in pending status, without allowing
the appeal to proceed, he would be denied his right to have this argument heard in a timely
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fashion. The ALJ here could very well hold in 0 H B H B favor on the argument that
Respondent maintains an illegal exclusive list of covered durable medical equipment. If this
appeal is allowed to proceed that decision would be reached well before the Court of Appeals
enters its decision and order. Based on these points raised b y ^ H H I the ALJ ruled that this
appeal should move forward.
ARGUMENT
In this motion to place this appeal in pending status Respondent contends that in the
Conley/Olguin case
that the reasonable standard argument is before the Court of Appeals. The state is not
opposing the issue as it was heard at the agency level of the adjudicative process.
Further, the appellate attorney for the state informed counsel for respondent agency in the
present matter that the petitioner in the appeal has submitted an amended appellate brief
where the reasonable standards argument is more fully presented to the court.
Respondent's Motion, pp. 2-3 (emphasis added.) However, while Respondent's appellate
attorney represents that Respondent in that case has not opposed consideration of the Reasonable
Standards argument "as it was heard at the agency level", it does oppose that part of the
Reasonable Standards argument identified above t h a t ^ H H B ^ ^

to

P r e s e n t i*1 this appeal.

"Because petitioners did not raise and the ALJ did not rule on this issue in the course of the
administrative proceedings, petitioners have waived it for purposes of appeal." (Respondent's
Conley/Olguin Amended Response Brief, p. 21) A copy of the relevant portions of
Conley/Olguin' brief as attached as Exhibit A, and Respondents brief as Exhibit B. Should the
Utah Court of Appeals in Conley/Olguin accept Respondent's argument, and not consider the
"exclusive list" argument the Conley/Olguin decision may not be determinative in this
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administrative appeal. Therefore f P H H H will be substantially prejudiced in his right to have
his appeal timely heard and decided.
In the Conley/Olguin appeal the petitioners made reference in their legal arguments to
three documents: the September 4,1998 Dear State Medicaid Director letter, a Letter of
Understanding between Respondent and the plaintiffs who had sued Respondent because they
were denied coverage of SACDs because they were adults, and the Utah Medicaid Provider
Manual-Medical Supplies List. Respondent moved that the Court of Appeals strike those
documents because they were not introduced in the administrative proceedings. The Court
granted that motion. A copy of that Order is attached as Exhibit C. flHHHHQ will present
those documents in these administrative hearings. It is possible that the Conley/Olguin decision
will be influenced by the absence of those documents. To place this appeal in pending status
would deny |BHBBB|his right to timely present those documents as a part of his legal
arguments. He will be substantially prejudiced in his right to have his appeal timely heard and
decided.
Medicaid Act regulations require that decisions in the administrative review process be
timely made. In most circumstances, a decision must be reached within ninety days of the date a
request for administrative review is filed. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(f)(1)(H). See also Shifflett v.
Koslowski, 843 F.Supp. 133 (WD. Va. 1994). 0 M H J | f i l e d

a

Request for Hearing/Agency

Action on or about December 23,2010. A written decision should be entered no later than
March 23,2011. In Conley/Olguin Appellants' Reply Brief is not due until February 14,2011.
Oral argument has not been scheduled. The Utah Court of Appeals decision will be entered long
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after March 23,2011. Clearly, there will not be a timely decision in this appeal should it be
placed in pending status. Placing this case in pending status will violate the Medicaid Act.
T H E R E F O R E , ^ J J ( | ^ requests that Respondent's Motion to Place in Pending
Status be denied,, and legal memoranda be filed as scheduled.
DATED this 21st day of January, 2011.

Robert B. Denton
Attorney for Jacob Smith

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, first class mail, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Response to Respondent's Motion to Place in
Pending Status in Case No. 10-357-01, this 21st day of January, 2011, to the following:
David McKnight
Division of Health Care Financing
Utah Department of Health
P.O. Box 142901
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-2901
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David McKnight, (#5218)
Assistant Attorneys General
Mark Shurtleff (#4666)
Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
288 North 1460 West, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-3101
(801) 538-6404
dmckmght@utah. gov
Attorneys for Respondent, Utah Department of Health

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION MEDICAID AND HEALTH FINANCING
FAIR HEARINGS SECTION

REPLY TO PETITIONER'S
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO
PLACE CASE IN PENDING
STATUS

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 10-357-01

Utah Department of Health
Division of Medicaid and Health Financing,

ALJ Mary Kienitz

Respondent.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63 G-4-102(9) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act,
respondent, Utah Department of Health by and through David McKnight, Assistant Attorney
General, as part of its motion for the presiding officer to issue an order to place the above entitled
matter in pending status, replies to petitioner's response.
Reply Argument Supporting Motion
The petitioner correctly points out that the issue in both the Conlely/Olguin (hereafer
Conley) case and the present case is strictly a legal one concerning whether the limitation of
S ACDs to minors is consistent with the reasonable standards provision. Petitioner in the Conley
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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case has raised each of the legal arguments (more fully before the court of appeals) petitioner
intends to make in the present case.
Petitioner wishes to introduce a 1998 settlement agreement concerning SACDs involving
respondent agency. A private agreement between parties to a former lawsuit, not even filed in the
court in that action, has no bearing on the legal issue in the Conley case. The 12 to 13 year old
settlement agreement could have been reached for a variety of reasons, the circumstances
surrounding the agreement are uncertain and most important the agreement is not legal authority.
As such, it has no application to Conley or the present case which concerns only a legal
question.
As to the CMS, 1998 "Dear State Medicaid Director" letter, petitioner's argument that it
did not present the letter in the Conley administrative proceeding and is precluded from
presenting the letter in its appeal does not mean that the substance of that letter is not presently
before the court of appeals. Even though the letter itself was not used, reference to the letter with
its relevant language and the argument petitioner wants to assert based on the letter is included
and discussed in the Conley amended appellate brief and in a case cited in the brief (respondent
provided a copy of the brief to the ALJ, the pertinent case explained and relied on by Conley is
William T. V. Taylor, 465 RSupp.2d 1267,1282-1283 (N.D. Ga. 2000)).
Petitioner also asserts as a new matter the need to address the list of durable medical
equipment. The DME list doesn't prove anything the state hasn!t already acknowledged in the
Conley case. That is, the state argued that SACDs fall only under speech therapy which means
SACDs are not included in the preapproved DME lists. With SACDs falling only under speech
therapy and not on a DME list, petitioner is able to argue (as it does) in its appellate brief the
2
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issue of a having a meaningful process concerning items not on the DME list. Further, the fact
that petitioner, as well as Conley and Olguin are able to use the administrative process to contest
the denial of SACDs to adults is proof in and of itself that a meaningful process or procedure for
challenging their exclusion exists. Again, the issue of a list and meaningful process to contest
the list is addressed in Oonley amended brief.
Finally, petitioner asserts his right to have the hearing process move forward in a timely
manner. Placing the present case in pending status will not deny petitioner a timely hearing right
since the issue involved in petitioner's case cannot be resolved until the identical facts and issue
before the court of appeals in Conley are resolved. Putting the case in pending status will not
delay the final outcome of petitioner's case. Even if petitioner's case has a new sub-issue, how
the court of appeals rules on the Conley case will at a minimum substantially control and impact
petitioner's case. Again, petitioner's case cannot be ultimately resolved until the court of appeals
rules on Conley.
In sum, this case and the Conley case involve purely a legal issue that will be resolved in
Conley. There is nothing applicable to the legal issue in the present case that the appellate court
will not hear and consider. Whatever the appellate decides in Conley will be binding precedent.
DATED this 26th day of January, 2011.

MARKL. SHURTLEFF (#4666)
Utah Attorney General

-SignedDavid McKnight, (#5218)
Assistant Attorneys General
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___

No: 10-357-01

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of January, 2011, I e-mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing REPLY TO PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO PLACE CASE IN
PENDING STATUS, to the following parties:
ROBERTDENTON
DISABILITY LAW CENTER
rdenton@disabilitylawcenter.org
MARYKJENITZ
ALJ, UDOH/DMHF
mkienitz^utah. gov
ANITAHALL
COVERAGE AND REIMBURSEMENT
UDOH/DMHF
ahall@utah.gov

-signed- D. McKnight
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